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Ireco1s brief can be summed up very simply:

take the

trial court's findings from which Megabar has not appealed and try
to sneak the processor through under the same umbrella.

Confuse

the issue by blending together the evidence and law relating to
the product (cast explosive compositions) with the evidence
and law relating to the equipment that can be used to
manufacture this product as well as other products expressly
exempted from this litigation.

This over-reaching prompted this

appeal in the first place.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT IRECO'S CONTINUOUS
PROCESSOR WAS A TRADE SECRET
Ireco has no trade secret unless it has a secret.

Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98
(Utah 1981).

In its appeal brief, just as at trial, Ireco argues

cast explosive compositions and then tacks the processor on to
cast explosive compositions without supporting evidence or law.
Neither Ireco nor the trial court ever identified any secret that
distinguished Ireco1s process equipment from equipment generally
used to process energetic materials.
Ireco's brief

offers only the following argument to

support a claim that Ireco's continuous processor was a trade
secret: Ireco1s processor was a trade secret because Megabar filed
a patent application on Megabar's processor.
contrary to the evidence —
machine.

Ireco assumes a fact

that the Ireco machine is the Megabar

Megabar has set forth in its Appellants' Brief the many
-1-

differences of record between the Megabar and Ireco processors.
(R. 2224-26).

Ireco1s own expert testified to the fundamental

differences in the machines.

(R. 2184).

Ireco1s argument is further flawed by reliance on the
opinion of persons who are not patent experts.

The belief of

Megabar employees as to the patentability of Megabar1s machine
provides no basis for Ireco to claim a secret as to Ireco1s
machine.

Furthermore, Megabar formally abandoned its patent

application when it learned that others had patented the basic
elements of Megabar*s continuous processor.

Ireco1s entire

argument is moot.
Ireco ignores Utah's standard for proving a trade
secret.

Utah law requires proof of a device "which is USED in

one's business" and that gives a competitive advantage.

J&K

Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrishy 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah
1982) (emphasis added).

Ireco offered no evidence that it ever

used its processor in its business.

To the contrary, Ireco had to

admit that it had dismantled its processor. (R. 1955).

By

dismantling its machine, Ireco prevented itself from obtaining any
competitive advantage.
At trial, Ireco offered no evidence that its processor
was a trade secret.

On appeal, Ireco argues that Megabarfs one-

time belief that Megabar!s processor was patentable confers trade
secret status on Ireco1s processor as a matter of law.
no such law.
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There is

Neither Ireco nor the trial court defined the content or
boundaries of any Ireco trade secret relating to processing
equipment.

The evidence preponderates against any finding of an

Ireco trade secret in processing equipment.
lie THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT MEGABAR USED IRECO1S
PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY
As discussed in Megabar's original brief, a trade secret
plaintiff must prove not only that it has a secret, but also that
the defendant used that secret.

Microbiological Research Corp.

v, Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 (Utah 1981).

Ireco's brief

argues that Megabar based its processor on Ireco1s technology.
However, Megabar outlined in its original brief Ireco's lack of
evidence that Megabar used Ireco information.
The trial testimony was that John Peterson developed
Megabar's processor independently.

(R. 2218, 2222-27).

Lacking

evidence, Ireco cites an Ireco chart showing superficial
similarities between the machines.

Ireco also cites testimony

that Harvey Jessop developed a machine at Ireco and that Taylor
Abegg worked at Ireco while Jessop developed a machine.

None of

the above is evidence that Megabar used any Ireco information
secret or otherwise —

—

in development of the machine John Peterson

designed without any input from Harvey Jessop. (R. 2220-28).
III.

THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE OF INJURY
Ireco has no trade secret cause of action unless Megabar

injured Ireco by using an Ireco secret about processors.
Muna, supra . Citing J&K Computer Research, 642
-3-

P.2d 732, 735, Ireco argues that the "essential element" for
injury is value.

(Ireco Brief p. 25). However, what J&K

actually says at 735 is that a trade secret is a device "USED
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know it."

(Emphasis

added).

Ireco1s standard

No mention is made of injury or value.

has no basis in law.

Furthermore, even if value were the standard

for determining injury under Utah law, the only evidence of record
is that Irecofs processor had no value.

The best evidence of the

value of Ireco1s machine is Ireco1s own evaluation:

Ireco

dismantled its machine.
Ireco also claims that it was injured because Megabar
made disclosures about Megabarfs machine.

Once again, contrary to

the evidence at trial, Ireco assumes that the two machines are
one.

The critical question is how Ireco could be injured by

disclosures about a machine it scrapped.

Ireco had no plans to

use the machine, made no attempt to market it and cannibalized the
machine for parts to use in other equipment.
As if saying would make it so, Ireco repeats "it is clear
that Ireco was injured by Megabar1s misappropriation of IrecoTs
processing technology."

(Ireco Brief at 25). Ireco makes not one

citation to the record and has no finding of fact to support its
assertion of injury related to the processor.

The evidence

preponderates that Ireco was not injured by anything Megabar did
with Megabarfs processor.

-4-

For the element of injury, as for all other elements of a
trade secret case, Ireco relied entirely at trial upon evidence
relating to cast explosive compositions.

After convincing the

trial court that Ireco was injured by Megabar's appropriation of
information about cast explosive compositions, Ireco simply
drafted findings to cover everything else Megabar had invented,
safely trusting to the trial court's indignation and its own
protestations that whatever touched a cast explosive composition
was secret.

But even Ireco stopped short at drafting a finding of

fact claiming injury stemming from a processor Ireco had
scrapped.

Now Ireco asks this Court to accept its assertion of

injury without any support in the record.
IV. IRECO HAS NO INDEPENDENT GROUNDS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RELATED
TO ITS PROCESSOR.
Ireco apparently argues that, since Megabar induced Mr.
Jessop to leave Ireco in a manner found to violate his employment
contract, the court could properly award punitive damages in the
form of the present injunction.

Ireco1s reliance for this

proposition on Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 449 S.W.2d
87 (Tex. 1973), is misplaced.

In that case a jury had returned a

verdict of damages, including punitive damages.

The court

concluded that inducement to breach an employment contract
supported such an award.

In this case, however, Judge Sawaya

stayed for later hearing all questions of damages, and those
questions were ultimately settled out of court.

To now argue that

the subject injunction is somehow supportable as a measure of
-5-

exemplary damage not only finds no basis in law, it is
inconsistent with the prior action of the parties*
Moreover, Ireco1s assertion of tortious interference with
contractual relations is inapplicable for lack of proof of
injury.

Any relief Ireco might have against Harvey Jessop based

on his contract is not at issue here.

Harvey Jessop is not before

the court and Megabar was not a party to his contract.

Ireco must

have proved as to Megabar all the elements of tortious
interference, and one of those elements is plaintiff's damage.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977), cited in Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah 1983).
As discussed above, Ireco offered no evidence of injury
related to the processor, the trial court found no injury, and
Ireco admitted it had abandoned its processor.

But even if Ireco

had suffered damage related to the processor, it would have a
complete remedy at law and no right to the processor injunction
that has been stayed by the trial court.

Ireco overreaches law

and equity in asking this Court to enjoin Megabar from using its
independently developed processor when Ireco has abandoned its own
inferior processor.
V.

CONCLUSION
Ireco asserts that its processing technology was

"inextricably bound up with cast explosive compositions,"

(Ireco

Brief at 25) yet Ireco offered no evidence that its processor was
uniquely linked to cast explosive compositions.

-6-

Ireco1s view is

that everything it "had done and thought of and planned on
doing....constituted trade secrets." (R. 1679).

Contrary to Utah

law and the requirements of proof of each element of a trade
secret for each alleged trade secret, Ireco obtained a judgment
consistent with its own sweeping view of trade secrets.
Ireco argues that the trial court enjoys an advantaged
position with respect to witnesses.

But the appellate court with

the record before it is in the ideal position to apply objectivity
and distance.

The trial court focused on appropriation of an

explosives formulation secret, and thereafter failed to apply Utah
trade secret law to the processor question.

Without evidence of a

secret, use or injury relating to the processor, the trial court
simply swept the processor within the judgment as Ireco asked.
is for this Court to prevent a "kitchen sink" approach to trade
secret law and to reverse the judgment below with respect to
processor technology.
DATED this 7^

day of Decembers 1986
X,

Michele Mitchell
FABIAN St CLENDENIN
a Professional corporation
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